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Reflecting the trend in the business community, universities are
increasingly investing in intellectual property rights. But they are
often unsuccessful in realizing licensing revenues that provide ade-
quate return on investment. This paper considers how auctions
could potentially increase licensing efficiency and make university
intellectual property transactions more productive. The paper be-
gins by placing the auction in the universe of possible transaction
forms and considers how well it aligns to the unique nature of uni-
versity rights. Penn State's recent patent auctions provide useful
context. The paper then provides recommendations to modify the
auction structure for maximum benefit in university intellectual
property transactions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For some time, universities have engaged in periodic auctioning
of patent rights as a supplement o other forms of intellectual prop-
erty (IP) transactions.' The forum commonly used has been a third-
party site, such as ICAP Patent Brokerage (formerly Ocean Tomo),
which offers rights from private firms in addition to non-profit and
government actors.2 But, in 2014, Penn State University changed
the dynamic somewhat by offering assets from its patent portfolio
on a university designed and administered auction site.3 A total of
183 patents were offered during two auction periods in April and
December.4 Although there were a limited number of completed
1. See, e.g., Amy L. Landers, Liquid Patents, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 199, 209 (2006)
("Ocean Tomo's first auction offered patents from patentees including Motorola, Clorox, The
University of California and Ford Motor Company.").
2. ICAP PATENT BROKERAGE, http://icappatentbrokerage.com (last visited July 1, 2015).
3. Penn State to Auction Intellectual Property Licenses, PENN STATE NEWS, Mar. 4, 2014,
http://news.psu.edulstory/306440/2014/03/04/research/penn-state-auction-intellectual-prop-
erty-licenses.
4. Meeting with Dr. Ron Huss, Assoc. Vice President for Research & Tech. Transfer,
Pennsylvania State University, in State College, Pa (Mar. 31, 2015).
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transactions, the auction might be considered worthwhile from a
certain perspective, at least as a proof of concept.5
But why turn to auctions when simpler transaction forms exist?
Auctions are intended to solve (or at least ameliorate) a common
university technology transfer problem: the underutilization of
most university patents. According to one source, nearly 95% of
university-owned patents remain unlicensed.6 Often the prosecu-
tion and maintenance costs are sunk and become a net drain on
technology transfer funding. 7 This drain on funding causes most
(84%, according to one estimate8) university technology transfer of-
fices to lose money.9
This paper contributes to existing literature by conceptualizing
the utility and design of auctions for selling and licensing university
intellectual property. The focus will be on patents as the most
prominent and economically important embodiment of university
intellectual property.1 0 Part II begins with a discussion of the mo-
tivations behind university intellectual property transactions. This
discussion provides the context for determining transaction success
from the perspective of the parties. Part III considers the auction
in the universe of possible transaction forms and how well it aligns
to the unique nature of university rights. Part IV describes the sys-
tem that Penn State utilized in its 2014 auctions. This section re-
views the results and identifies limiting qualities. Finally, Part V
makes recommendations for modifying the auction structure in or-
der to maximize the potential benefits in university intellectual
property transactions. This paper also strives to provide implemen-
tation guidance to other universities considering auctions in the fu-
ture.
II. INTERESTS THAT MOTIVATE UNIVERSITY TRANSACTIONS
In the context of university-developed property, revenue realiza-
tion is vital. Profit, however, is not the only goal in licensing trans-
actions. Invention access for the economically disadvantaged and
5. Goldie Blumenstyk, Penn State's Patent Auction Produces More Lessons than Reve-
nue, CHRON. HIGHER ED., (May 1, 2014) http://chronicle.com/blogs/bottomline/penn-states-
patent- auction-produces-more-lessons-than-revenue/#disqusthread.
6. Heidi Ledford, Universities Struggle to Make Patents Pay, 501 NATURE 471, 471-72
(2013).
7. WALTER D. VALDIVIA, UNIVERSITY START-UPS: CRITICAL FOR IMPROVING
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 9 (2013), available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/pa-
pers/2013/11/university-start-ups-technology-transfer-valdivia.
8. Id.
9. Id.; see also Ledford, supra note 6, at 471-72.
10. But the discussion may apply to other types.
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the desire to achieve broad social utility are among other interests
inherent in these transactions. These interests are somewhat
unique to transactions in which a non-profit institution is a party.
Importantly, interests vary depending on the embodiment of intel-
lectual property. The social interest in federally funded medical re-
search, for example, is very different than that for enterprise soft-
ware tools. Parties seek to balance these interests, and an appreci-
ation of what is most important for any particular piece of IP is es-
sential for understanding whether an owner will likely transact or
dedicate information to the public domain.
A. University Interests
By virtue of the fact that the university is an intellectual property
owning entity, there exists some insight into university motiva-
tions. In particular, patent perfection is not required. Indeed, pa-
tent perfection involves a considerable expense of time and money,
and a university's choice to carve out property rights, rather than
dedicate a particular invention to the public, suggests that it seeks
a property-related benefit. Nevertheless, the ability to profit from
exclusivity may give way to a university's more nuanced goals.
1. Return on Research Investment and New Revenue
Sources
Most universities are looking for some economic benefit at least
in excess of the cost of securing intellectual property rights like pa-
tents. Not unlike a private firm, universities do not need to obtain
substantial revenue on each patent." The baseline goal is simply
to gain enough revenue to support portfolio expenses and technol-
ogy transfer personnel.12 If more profit can be obtained, it may be
allocated for other education-related uses and split with the inven-
tor(s).
However, as noted above, universities are often unsuccessful in
realizing patent profits. The fact that most technology transfer of-
fices are money losers provides a strong motivation to improve the
financials. Taking deadweight property rights and turning them
into cash of any kind can be extremely useful. Toward that end,
11. See Yuichi Watanabe, Patent Licensing and the Emergence of a New Patent Market,
9 Hous. Bus. & TAX L.J. 445, 451-53 (2009) (discussing the utility of different patent portfolio
models).
12. See Jay P. Kesan, Transferring Innovation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2169, 2179-80
(2009) (describing the nature and goals of university technology transfer offices, particularly
in terms of "breaking even").
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many university technology transfer offices are not only interested
in identifying all potentially patentable inventions, but also finding
efficient methods of connecting with potential licensees.13 Some
technology transfer offices essentially "advertise" available patents
in hopes of attracting licensees.14
A university may avoid the difficulty of blindly funding research
costs by engaging partner firms from the outset. Sponsored re-
search can lead to guaranteed use of university intellectual prop-
erty if the relationship is properly structured. However, these re-
lationships may be destined to play a niche role because firms often
wish to own the intellectual property in university collaborations.
A university may find that corporate partners are difficult to secure
without such a concession.
Finally, some universities may be successful in mining untapped
intellectual property from units not accustomed to patenting. Sci-
ence and engineering schools are frequently targeted from the out-
set, but agricultural and even business innovations may be poten-
tially profitable, yet otherwise unused. An efficient technology
transfer mechanism ensures that such IP mining endeavors are
likely to be successful, rather than add to the pile of unlicensed
rights and their attendant sunk costs.
2. Access to University Innovation
Universities also have a strong interest in ensuring access to
their innovations. This interest can arguably contrast with some of
the basic principles of intellectual property. If IP is a market exclu-
sion device, universities are essentially limiting the population that
can freely use innovation by locking it up with intellectual property.
However, it is also understood that many innovations require some
investment in commercialization. Production facilities must be
built, materials secured, employees hired, etc. Private parties are
also unlikely to engage in such investment without some guarantee
that others will not be able to compete as free riders. Capturing
13. Linara Axanova, U.S. Academic Technology Transfer Models: Traditional, Experi-
mental and Hypothetical, 47 LES NOUVELLES 125, 129 (2012) (discussing several models of
university patent protection that focus on finding licensees rather than simply filing patents
on every invention).
14. See, e.g., Explore WARF-Inventions and Patents, Wis. ALUMNI RES. FOUND. (WARF),
http://www.warf.org/technologies/inventions-patents-and-portfolios.cmsx (last visited Oct.
14, 2015); Select Technologies, MIT TECH. LICENSING OFF., http://technology.mit.edul (last
visited Oct. 14, 2015); TechFinder, STAN. U. OFF. OF TECH. LICENSING, http://techfinder.stan-
ford.edul (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
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intellectual property may represent he difference between an idea
sitting fallow or a firm having the incentive to bring it to market.15
However, it is also true that a fully firm-oriented perspective on
IP may lead to some inventions being underutilized or even bur-
ied.16 Additionally, acquiring or licensing firms may use patent
rights to charge supra-optimal prices that ensure vulnerable popu-
lations cannot access the innovation. Thus, universities have a par-
allel interest in ensuring broader access that is stronger than a typ-
ical firm. Funders, taxpayers, and other university supporters who
view the non-profit mission of the university as requiring substan-
tial access will likely require a position of broader access. Key ele-
ments of the law (see Figure 2, infra) support this more expansive
view of access.17
3. Avoiding Patent Trolls
Some believe that university IP should not be used to interfere
unfairly with the market, particularly if it impacts current employ-
ers and producers. To the extent that patent trolls create issues in
this regard, universities have taken notice.1 8 Patent trolls are usu-
ally defined as non-practicing entities that utilize the inefficiencies
and information asymmetries in the market to extort market par-
ticipants.19 Patent trolls may own weak patents or rights that cover
only a small part of a product or service, but use the expense and
complexity of patent litigation to coerce a settlement.20 Universities
can inadvertently facilitate trolling behavior by selling or licensing
patent rights to an entity with the sole interest of suing and extort-
ing legitimate firms. The fact that universities must dispose of
15. This may be referred to as the "commercialization theory" of intellectual property.
See Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 460, 463-64 (2015).
16. See Brian J. Love, Do University Patents Pay Offt Evidence from a Survey of Univer-
sity Inventors in Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 285,
320 (2014) (considering evidence of research suppression from university patents in a survey
of 269 university inventors in the field of computer engineering and computer science).
17. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2012).
18. See, e.g., Robert A. Brown & James P. Clements, A Patent-Troll Bill With Bad College
Grades, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-patent-troll-bill-with-bad-
college-grades-1429051694/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2016) (describing legislative action taken to
reduce the abuse of patents).
19. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS ET AL., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION, 3-4 (2013)
https://www.whitehouse. gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent report.pdf [hereinafter WHITE




rights to realize any profit on inventions opens them up to trolls
more frequently than a typical company.21
Of course, if profits were realized, why would universities care
about access as a goal? The answer is the public service mission of
higher education in the United States. The advantages that such
institutions retain depend, to some extent, on being perceived as
more benevolent than a private firm. 2 2 To preserve such a percep-
tion, universities must present themselves in a manner that demon-
strates the continued right to profit from federal research funding
and maintain tax advantages. For that reason, universities are sen-
sitive to the accusation that they are actually creating market fail-
ures. A consortium of prominent research universities has gone on
record to oppose transactions with patent trolls and advocate licens-
ing practices that limit trolling influence.23
B. Licensee Interests
The other side of the transaction equation is of course just as im-
portant as the university's interest. Firms have unique needs in
dealing with universities, in part because the firms usually will
never fully own the invention, but also because they may not par-
ticipate in the genesis of the work. A successful strategy must take
these needs into account.
1. Market Exclusivity Versus Access to a Standard
A firm may desire market exclusivity if the product involved will
require significant investment to commercialize. This is particu-
larly true if that investment relates to prototyping, market analy-
sis, or other activities that can be easily copied by competitors.
Even federally regulated arrangements can convey this power if a
university offers exclusive licenses. Although federal law allows the
government to use the invention and allows march-in rights, these
uses rarely pose a competitive challenge.24 In addition, it is com-
mon for universities to retain their own rights to use the invention.
However, these rights generally impact research only and also do
not pose a competitive issue.
21. See Daniel R. Cahoy, Toward a Fair Social Use Framework for College and University
Intellectual Property, 41 J.C. & U.L. 485, 505-06 (2015).
22. DEREK BOK, BEYOND THE IVORY TOWER 61-66 (1982) (noting the relationship be-
tween public support and the public service mission of the college or university).
23. ASS'N OF AM. UNIV., IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: NINE POINTS TO CONSIDER IN
LICENSING UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY 6 (2007), http://www.aau.edulworkarea/downloadas-
set.aspx?id=2642.
24. 35 U.S.C. §§ 202, 203.
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Somewhat less recognized is the fact that a firm may not have a
problem with a non-exclusive license and may even favor this ar-
rangement in some cases. For example, if an invention could be-
come an industry standard or generally accepted procedure or pro-
cess, it may be advantageous to ensure that competitors are using
it. In addition, non-exclusive licenses are generally less expensive,
and therefore, are lower risk. Basic scientific research tools may
provide one of the best examples. One of the most successful uni-
versity patents of all time covers the Cohen-Boyer process for cell
cloning.25 This process was widely adopted and licensed at a rela-
tively low rate to any interested party.26 The licensees were con-
cerned solely with access to the technology because it provided the
basis for other inventions that could be commercialized exclu-
sively.27
It is important to note that the option of exclusivity versus non-
exclusivity is not binary. The nature of intellectual property, along
with its broad exemptions from antitrust laws, provides options
that do not exist in other business arrangements. Licensing ar-
rangements can encompass multiple firms who avoid direct compe-
tition by taking only part of the property owner's so-called "bundle
of rights."2 8 For example, licenses can be split geographically29 or
by industry segment30 and allocated to different parties for different
uses.
25. Process for Producing Biologically Functional Molecular Chimeras, U.S. Patent No.
4,237,224 (filed Jan. 4, 1979) (issued Dec. 2, 1980) (the much discussed Cohen-Boyer patent
on gene cloning, generally considered to be one of the most widely licensed patent in history).
26. See Kesan, supra note 12, at 2173-74 (describing the licensing model of the Cohen-
Boyer patent).
27. Id.
28. For a variety of options, see ASS'N OF AM. UNIV., supra note 23, at 12-13.
29. 35 U.S.C. § 261.
30. JOHN W. SCHLICHER, PATENT LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES § 11.34 (2d ed.
2003) ("Field of Use Restrictions").
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Figure 1: Licensing Options in Decreasing Exclusivity
Exclusive Exclusive Co-Exclusive
License License in License Convertible Fully Non-
for Full Different Among Small Exclusive or Excusive
Patent Geographic Number of Non-Exclusive License
Term Regions Firms License
Unfortunately, it may be difficult from the outset to know
whether firms prefer exclusive or non-exclusive arrangements.
Therefore, licensors tend to set the terms by default. Alternatively,
licensors may choose to condition exclusivity on certain events or
milestones, which may permit a licensee to reveal its preferences.31
Figure 1 provides a basic menu of licensing options in decreasing
exclusivity from which licensors may choose.
2. Licensing Revenue
Some firms obtain rights for the purpose of acting as an interme-
diary to others' use of the invention.32 These middle-parties can
take many forms and have positive or negative market impacts de-
pending on their enforcement strategy.33 The primary focus of such
firms is often royalty income.34 For example, patent trolls fall into
a royalty-focused category, seeking to compel existing firms to li-
cense in order to continue their business.35 However, a venture cap-
31. BRIAN G. BRUSVOLD ET AL., DRAFTING PATENT LICENSE AGREEMENTS § 4.03.E.2 (7th
ed. 2012). These requirements, which may be pitched as "best efforts" clauses or something
more specific, ensure that a non-productive, exclusive licensee does not lock up the invention.
See JOHN GLADSTON MILLS III ET AL., PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 19:20 (2d ed. 2007) (de-
scribing the utility of inserting a working requirement into a license).
32. See generally Allen W. Wang, Rise of the Patent Intermediaries, 25 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 159 (2010).
33. Id. at 165-66.
34. Id. at 165 (noting that intermediaries "focus on connecting parties that wish to mon-
etize existing patent rights").
35. Jiaqing "Jack" Lu, The Economics and Controversies of Nonpracticing Entities
(NPEs): How NPEs and Defensive Patent Aggregators Will Change the License Market, 47
LES NOUVELLES 147, 149-50 (2012).
Winter 2016 61
Duquesne Law Review
ital aggregator, focused on putting together the pieces of a new tech-
nology entity,36 is also an intermediary with no intent on practicing
the invention.
Initially, one might ask why a university would see a benefit in
licensing to a third party, who will then sublicense to others, when
the university could fill that same role. Intermediaries, however,
can play an important administrative role in identifying relevant
technology and collecting royalties, both of which are outside of the
typical university's expertise. In addition, intermediaries may en-
able a more complex exchange of rights than what can be achieved
by a non-profit educational institution with a different primary mis-
sion. In some contexts, the more efficient route is to permit the
intermediary to make the relevant connections and better spread
the use of the invention.
3. Inventor or Creator Access
Perhaps more important to licensees in the university context is
the possibility of working with the technology inventors. Licensees
may wish to additionally obtain non-patented know-how, which
could facilitate future invention development.37 Such intellectual
capital is not always available when licensing from private entities
as a result of competitive concerns. Nevertheless, as noted above,
universities are not generally market players, and inventors are
free to serve as a rich source of information for product development
and even participation in the licensing firm.
III. THE AUCTION AS AN OPTION FOR LICENSING UNIVERSITY IP
Assuming the interests align and parties elect to engage in an
intellectual property transaction, what form is best? As a class of
property rights, intellectual property can be sold or licensed in a
variety of ways. Perhaps the most common transaction form is the
arms-length, one-on-one negotiation.38 Such transactions have the
advantage of facilitating deeper discovery of the nature of the
rights. If know-how is to be included, a licensee may have a better
opportunity to interview the creators. Negotiated transactions can
also be personalized. In particular, the terms may be structured to
36. See generally Wang, supra note 32.
37. Notably, non-patented rights may be handled separately to avoid antitrust re-
strictions on patent licenses. See Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2408 (2015)
(citing Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964)).
38. This may also be referred to as a "bilateral negotiation." John Jarosz, et al., Patent
Auctions: How Far Have We Come?, 45 LES NOUVELLES 11, 11 (2010).
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fit the specific interests of the parties. Some disadvantages of ne-
gotiated transactions, however, are the costs associated with iden-
tifying parties and assets, as well as the barriers to reducing infor-
mation asymmetries.39
A second form of intellectual property transactions is the ex-
change or clearinghouse.4 0 In this iteration, large groups of buyers
and sellers come together in a forum that attempts to match inter-
ests.41 The exchange owner may serve as an active intermediary,
facilitating the connection between buyer and seller (or licensor and
licensee).42 In general, exchanges are a starting point for future
discussions that are comparable to a standard negotiation.43 But
the exposure to multiple parties presents the possibility of lower
information asymmetries and better matching in terms of portfolio
offerings. Somewhat related, but often more limited in scope, are
patent pools with attendant rules for access and use.4 4
Auctions present another level of abstraction from one-on-one ne-
gotiations or exchanges.45 There are a variety of forms, but the fa-
miliar English option appears to be the default.46 After the property
is offered (with or without a reserve price) bids are placed usually
for a fixed, upfront payment. Bids may be accepted only one time
(a sealed bid) or bidders may have the opportunity to increase their
bids dynamically (an ascending auction). An auction can be for a
single transaction across a wide field or consist of multiple bidding
opportunities. At the end of the auction, the right is typically as-
signed to the single bidder with the highest bid. Although alternate
39. Id. at 12.
40. F. Russell Denton & Paul J. Heald, Random Walks, Non-Cooperative Games, and the
Complex Mathematics of Patent Pricing, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175, 1249 (2003) (describing
patent license clearinghouses as an "attempt to lower the cost of identifying inventions that
are available to be licensed.").
41. See, e.g., WIPO Green- The Marketplace for Sustainable Technology, WORLD INTELL.
PROP. ORG., https://www3.wipo.int/wipogreen/en/aboutus/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) ("an in-
teractive marketplace that connects owners of new technologies with individuals or compa-
nies looking to commercialize, license or otherwise access or distribute a green technology").
42. See, e.g., Patent Sales, RATIONAL PATENT (RPX), https://www.rpxcorp.com/rpx-ser-
vices/rpx-patent-sales/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) (describing the firm's role as a patent pur-
chaser that then connects individual rights and portfolios with interested licensees).
43. Id.
44. Richard J. Gilbert, Ties That Bind: Policies to Promote (Good) Patent Pools, 77
ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 5-6, 18-21 (2010) (noting that patent pools are often formed to facilitate
the adoption of a technology standard and describing the business strategy and goals of pa-
tent pooling).
45. Jarosz et al., supra note 38, at 12-13.
46. Paul Milgrom, Auctions and Bidding: A Primer, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 13 (1989).
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pricing arrangements are available and might entail strategic ad-
vantages,47 the winner typically pays his or her bid for the auc-
tioned right.
A. Is University IP uniquely suited to Auctions?
Is there some reason that university intellectual property would
particularly benefit from auctions, as compared to other forms of
transferring rights? While the legal boundaries are the same, there
are a variety of ownership restrictions and business practicalities
that make university IP unique. The distinctions are most striking
in the context of patents. Many of these properties are the product
of federal law and are the result of a policy-based push to commer-
cialize university innovation. Auctions may be a particularly useful
transaction structure in this environment.
1. The Bayh-Dole Act Places Restrictions on Sale and Profit
When one thinks about auctions, one imagines property being
sold at the final drop of a gavel. The relationship between buyer
and seller is brief, and the pressure of bidding is enhanced by the
notion of finality. But it is exactly this state that cannot exist in
most university patent transactions. If federal funding is involved,
a license will be the only possible outcome.
University research is largely funded by federal dollars.48 This
has been the case since the ramp up of federal funding after World
War JJ.49 But the commercialization of federally funded research
was often lacking, partly because of the inability of firms to secure
proprietary rights.5 0 Federally funded research was always patent-
able, but the right to patent was generally controlled by the funding
agency.5 1 With no consistent policy on patenting or licensing, such
research often sat idly on the shelf.52 This changed in the 1980s, as
a result of the Bayh-Dole Act. 5 3 The law permitted universities to
47. William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16
J. FIN. 8, 20-23 (1961).
48. AsS'N OF AM. UNIV., University Research: The Role of Federal Funding (2011),
http://www.aau.edulworkarea/downloadasset.aspx?id= 11588.
49. DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION 23-27 (2004).
50. Gary Pulsinelli, Share and Share Alike: Increasing Access to Government-Funded In-
ventions Under the Bayh-Dole Act, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 393, 394 (2006).
51. Id. at 397-402.
52. Id.
53. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended in
various sections of the United States Code).
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file, own, and license patents that were the product of federal re-
search dollars.54 As a result of the Bayh-Dole Act, university pa-
tenting skyrocketed.55
To ensure that universities did not simply become low-cost, no-
risk generators of intellectual property for industry, some re-
strictions were set on commercialization. Most important is the re-
striction on selling patent rights without the explicit permission of
the funding agency.5 6 Without such permission, universities have
only the option to license the patent rights.5 7 The general percep-
tion is that agencies rarely agree to such sales, and approval of
blanket rights to sell portfolios are particularly uncommon.
Figure 2: Unique Characteristics of Bayh-Dole Patent
Agreements5 8
LFederal government 
retains right to practice 
invention (§ 202)
Federal government can require report of invention (§ 202)
Preference for licensing to small business firms _
No assignment (sale) without permissior. License is default § 202)
Federal government can license another if university and licenses do
not commercialize within reasonable time period (§ 203)
Products embodying licensed invention wi be
manufactured in United States (§ 204)
University patent licenses can be structured as either running
royalties or lump sum payments. For other types of IP licenses,
such as trademarks or trade secrets, the royalty can be spaced out
to allow for initial low-cost development and increased payments a
54. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-202.
55. Peter Lee, Patents and the University, 63 DUKE L.J. 1, 36-38 (2013) (describing the
shift in traditional norms and the recent embrace of university patenting).
56. 35 U.S.C. § 202.
57. Id.
58. 35 U.S.C. §§ 202-204.
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the market matures. But due to clear (though some might say mis-
guided) Supreme Court precedent,59 no payments can be made for
use of an invention after the patent expires. Thus, the patent term
sets somewhat of a limit on how much revenue a patent license can
elicit.
Another important Bayh-Dole oriented restriction is the require-
ment that inventors share in the revenue from sales or licenses.60
The statute sets no specific percentage, but a common university
rate is 2 5 %- 3 3% of profits.61 Colleges or departments within a uni-
versity may benefit from additional revenue sharing on top of that.
In addition, because patents are licensed and not sold, inventors
will commonly receive payments only if the invention is commer-
cialized.
The net result of these Bayh-Dole restrictions is to increase pres-
sure on universities to identify the best licensee for the short-term
nature of the transaction.
2. University Direct Use Is Rare
Despite the common restriction on the sale of university patent
rights, some transaction with a third party is generally required for
the institution to realize revenue. The obvious reason is that uni-
versities rarely commercialize their own property. This is partially
due to the educational mission of universities, but it is also related
to the risks inherent in commercialization. Very few universities
would be eager to take on the responsibility of managing manufac-
turing and the attendant risks of product liability, particularly in
addition to the burden of caring for the safety of student popula-
tions. Even in the case of trademarked goods that are specifically
linked to universities, licensed firms generally handle the actual
manufacturing and distribution.62 For innovations, out-licensing or
selling is the only realistic option for profit in most cases.
The inability to commercialize independently creates particular
pressure on universities. First, this inability creates a need to part-
ner with third parties relatively quickly in order to recoup sunk
59. See Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2415 (affirming the rule prohibiting patent payments after
expiration, originally articulated in Brulotte u. Thys, 379 U.S. 29 (1964)).
60. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(B).
61. ALAN S. GUTTERMAN, BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS SOLUTIONS § 209:24 (2014).
62. Jacob H. Rooksby, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 349, 359 (2014) ("Collegiate licensing en-
tails institutions of higher education licensing the use of their trademarked names, logos,
and insignia to companies that produce consumption products . . . .").
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costs. Every day without return-after prosecution costs are allo-
cated,63 licensing officers are paid, and buildings are maintained-
puts a drag on university finances. Because t chnology transfer of-
fices have traditionally been viewed as profit centers,64 they have a
strong incentive to move property to the marketplace or move on.
One positive aspect of this compulsion is that universities may have
a greater incentive to form relationships with the business commu-
nity. In an ideal world, incubators are created and, eventually, true
university-firm partnerships develop that provide funding and lo-
cal employment beneficial to the university community.
In addition, in a time of tightening economics-particularly for
state universities-there is a push to find revenue from new
sources.65 University intellectual property is a common area of in-
terest for administrators looking to address such budget shortfalls.
The success stories, particularly from the pharmaceutical field,66
feed this desire-though many in the tech transfer community be-
lieve that luck is a significant factor.67 Still, to the extent that any
revenue can be generated from rights sitting on the shelf, facilitat-
ing intellectual property transactions makes sense.
Finally, the lack of direct university commercialization actually
creates advantages for universities to the extent that it reduces the
potential for marketplace retaliation. When companies operate in
a market filled with enough overlapping rights to foster patent liti-
gation, a danger exists. There is always the possibility that two
firms' patents will read on each other's products and a battle of pa-
tent rights may ensue. But universities have no such concerns be-
cause when only one firm is in the market, competition is elimi-
nated. To be able to license, sell or litigate without fear of another's
conflicting rights is freeing. Arguably, it is the primary incentive
63. David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, 65 VAND. L. REV.
677, 688-90 (2012) (estimating the average cost to obtain a patent to be approximately
$22,000).
64. See Kesan, supra note 12, at 2179-80 (stating that TTOs often assess success based
on licensing revenue).
65. Francesca Di Meglio, Colleges Explore Alternate Revenue Streams, BLOOMBERG Bus.,
Aug. 8, 2008, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2008-08-08/colleges-explore-
alternative-revenue-streamsbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-ad-
vice.
66. Vicki Loise & Ashley J. Stevens, The Bayh-Dole Act Thirns 30, 45 LES NOUVELLES
185, 188 (2010). Northwestern University has earned hundreds of millions of dollars from
its patents licensed to Pfizer to produce Lyrica. Id.
67. See VALDIVIA, supra note 7, at 10 (describing how universities compete for license
revenue prestige and noting the lucky universities that owned high-profit patents).
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underlying patent trolling behavior. Some have even gone as far as
to accuse universities of sometimes acting as patent trolls.68
The freedom of non-commercialization, in the case of state uni-
versities, is coupled with the immunity from federal intellectual
property litigation based in the Eleventh Amendment.69 Even if a
state university acted in a way to infringe another's patent rights
(i.e., the laboratory use of a research tool), no lawsuit could be
threatened seeking anything beyond a future injunction.70
3. University Patents Are Not Subject to Prior Use Defense
As a result of the America Invents Act of 2011 ("AIA"), a limited
defense exists for firms that engage in secret, prior use of an inven-
tion before another patents it.71 While public prior use or sale would
invalidate another's patent application, the Patent and Trademark
Office cannot evaluate secret prior use. The prior use defense was
introduced to avoid litigation on a long-term use that predates an-
other's invention.72
The prior use defense weakens patents to some extent. A prior
user can essentially ignore the time and money another spends in
diligently securing a patent right because the patent is ineffective.
Such a firm will have no interest in clearing rights or securing a
license. However, there is some debate as to how often the prior use
defense is likely to be raised.73
Regardless of how often the prior-use defense arises, universities
are not subject to it. The revised § 273 of the AIA clearly exempts
universities and inventors obligated to assign to universities.74 The
language of the exception states that it vests "at the time the inven-
tion was made," and is not eliminated by subsequent licensing and
transfer.7 5 This exception, therefore, provides some additional
power to university patent rights, and makes them more attractive
as licensing properties.
68. Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 611, 615-16 (2008).
69. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
70. Gary Pulsinelli, Freedom to Explore: Using the Eleventh Amendment to Liberate Re-
searchers at State Universities from Liability for Intellectual Property Infringements, 82
WASH. L. REV. 275, 300-04 (2007).
71. 35 U.S.C. § 273.
72. Technically, it was expanded from a business method, patent-only exemption that
had existed prior to the AIA.
73. Dennis Crouch, Prior User Rights Defense, PATENTLY-O (Feb. 1, 2012), http://patent-
lyo.com/patent/2012/02/prior-user-rights-defense.html.




B. Are Auctions Uniquely Suited to University IP?
While the auction format is the least common format for trans-
acting university intellectual property, it may offer a number of ad-
vantages to the alternative mechanisms. An auction that awards
the object to the highest bidder and sets an appropriate non-trivial
reserve price will maximize a seller's expected revenue when (1)
there is a single, indivisible item for sale by a monopolistic seller
and (2) a fixed set of bidders have private information about their
own personal valuation of the item.76 In other words, auctions can
theoretically bring in the greatest revenue under these conditions.
Furthermore, due to the famous Revenue Equivalence Theorem,77
many auction designs will not impact expected auction performance
for the seller. Thus, a university does not have to be concerned with
picking the perfect auction mechanism. Because university intel-
lectual property makes the university the sole seller of a unique
item, and it is likely that potential acquirers have proprietary and
differing use values for the rights, it seems that university intellec-
tual property fits the auction model well. In times of limited uni-
versity budgets, such an opportunity to maximize revenue streams
cannot be ignored. Furthermore, subject to meeting the reserve
price, the auction tends to allocate the object to the bidder with the
highest expected use value. Thus, the auction might also allow the
university to further its mission to serve the public interest.
It is also no coincidence that the proliferation of auctions in other
domains, such as procurement, consumer goods, and collectibles,
has occurred simultaneously with the growth of the Internet.78 Auc-
tions achieve high seller revenues by maximizing competition be-
tween bidders; therefore, identifying as many realistic bidders as
possible is important. The ability of university intellectual property
auctions to identify new, interested parties via an Internet-enabled
auction is also appealing. A second advantage of improvements in
technology is that auctions, with their well-defined rules and
shorter duration, may significantly lower administrative costs com-
pared to transactions by negotiation.
76. Roger B. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design, 6 MATHEMATICS OPERATIONS RES. 58, 69
(1981).
77. Id. at 65-66. The Revenue Equivalence Theorem states that any auction, which as-
signs the object to bidders with the same probability (possibly depending upon their value),
will always engender strategic behavior such that the expected revenue for the seller is the
same. See John H. Kagel, Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research, in THE HANDBOOK
OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 501, 503-04 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995).
78. See generally Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortacsu, Economic Insights from Internet Auc-
tions, 42 J. ECON. LITERATURE 457 (2004).
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Why, then, have auctions not become more popular for university
intellectual property? There are many reasons, including simple
institutional resistance, yielding the fear that auctions might not
function as well as expected in the university IP setting. There are
at least four potential limitations of the auction mechanism.
First, the highly uncertain nature of the value of university intel-
lectual property might severely limit the number of potential bid-
ders. While auctions usually function well when the value of the
object for sale has a clear, tangible use value, auctions face more
challenges when the future value is uncertain. A well-known ex-
ample of these challenges is the winner's curse, whereby the win-
ning bidder places overly high bids due to an optimistic assessment
of the value of the IP. 7 9 The result is that the winner loses money
and is often reluctant to bid in future auctions. Given that only a
very small percentage of university intellectual property is expected
to yield large profits, it is likely that many bidders will realize losses
due to the auction result. This risk of loss might reduce competition
and, therefore, limit the auction's ability to raise substantial reve-
nue.
Second, a related limitation of the auction setting is its tendency
to limit competition to one dimension of the contractual agreement
between the university and the acquirer of the intellectual property.
The Penn State IP auctions discussed in the next section, for exam-
ple, set an upfront flat fee as the sole bidding dimension in the auc-
tion.80 The use of the upfront flat fee might exacerbate the issues
of realized losses for bidders because they must bear all the risk of
an eventual low commercial value of the purchased IP. This is es-
pecially problematic if bidders are small and risk-averse. In con-
trast, a negotiation allows for risk sharing through royalty pay-
ments and the amendment of other contractual details that might
make the sale of the IP more attractive to both sides.
A third fear that must always be considered is the auction's sus-
ceptibility to bidder collusion. Since an auction can severely limit
bidder profits by fostering greater competition, bidders have a
strong incentive to collude in order to counteract this impact. Col-
79. Kenneth Hendricks & Robert H. Porter, An Empirical Study of an Auction with
Asymmetric Information, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 865, 880 (1988).
80. Meeting with Dr. Ron Huss, supra note 4.
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lusion has long been recognized as a common phenomenon in auc-
tions.81 Various changes to the auction design can impact the prev-
alence of collusive outcomes.82 Certain features indicate a greater
susceptibility of the particular domain to low revenue and collusive
outcomes. These features include a small number of bidders, bidder
familiarity, and multiple items for sale. Because university IP auc-
tions often occur for related groups of IP with a relatively limited
number of interested parties, the potential for collusion cannot be
ignored.
Finally, policy makers have worried that university IP auctions
might serve as an open door for patent trolls to obtain licenses in
order to conduct frivolous litigation.83 If patent trolls are able to
obtain university IP, the university will not necessarily be serving
the public, and might have to deal with a negative public percep-
tion.
IV. THE STRUCTURE OF THE PENN STATE UNIVERSITY
PATENT AUCTION
Given an understanding of transacting parties' motivations and
the objective utility of the auction mechanism, it is useful to con-
sider the real life example of Penn State. To what extent did the
university fulfill the interests of the parties? And how might the
structure be improved to generate increased revenue while preserv-
ing the non-profit mission of educational institutions? Of course,
such an analysis must acknowledge that Penn State was treading
rather new ground and was unlikely to have a perfect model from
the outset.
To assess the performance of Penn State's auctions, we sent out
a survey through Qualtrics (a third-party provided, online survey
tool) to prior participants. To incentivize participation, prior par-
ticipants were invited via email and informed that one respondent
would be randomly selected to receive a $100 Amazon gift card.
Moreover, they were assured anonymity to their responses. In total,
23 out of 109 non-university-related participants with an active
email address responded. The results of this survey are presented
alongside the description below.84
81. RALPH CASSADY, JR., AUCTIONS AND AUCTIONEERING 216 (1967).
82. Robert C. Marshall & Leslie M. Marx, The Vulnerability of Auctions to Bidder Collu-
sion, 124 Q. J. ECON. 883, 884 (2009).
83. See, e.g., Brown & Clements, supra note 18.
84. Survey questions and a sample survey invitation email are available upon request.
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In April of 2014, Penn State offered 73 issued patents for license
in the first university-run auction.85 The patents were primarily
related to engineering technologies.8 6 In general, these rights had
been available for license for some time, but the university's tech-
nology transfer office made no sales.87 One perspective, then, is that
the Penn State patent auction consisted of leftover patents that no
one wanted. On the other hand, it is perfectly reasonable to assume
that the patents had value and simply needed the right marketing
and distribution structure to engage interested clients. Moreover,
as noted above, the potential to make connections with industry and
generate interest in Penn State research was clearly an aspect of
the process.
In December of 2014, Penn State conducted a second auction.8 8
In this offering, licenses to 110 patents were on the table.89 The
technologies offered were relatively broader, spreading into fields
such as biotechnology, agriculture, and materials science.90 How-
ever, the offerings were similar to the first auction in that they were
old technologies, likely to be abandoned eventually.91 Notably, a
couple of survey respondents that participated in this auction held
their bids because the available technologies did not match their
needs or interests. Another respondent commented specifically on
the limited value of old, issued patents as a drawback.
Both auctions utilized a similar structure.92 For a period of two
weeks interested parties could bid on an online website (https://pa-
tents.psu.edul) for exclusive licenses for any or all of the patents.93
Only one survey respondent said that they ran out of time to digest
the amount of intellectual property present and decide on whether
to bid. The starting (reserve) price was either $5,000 or $10,000,
depending on how much time was left in the patent term.94 In some
cases, patents were only offered as bundles of related technologies.95
In addition to the upfront exclusive license payment, licensees













would be responsible for paying all future maintenance fees.96 In-
terestingly, 21% of the survey respondents thought that these start-
ing prices were too high.
Both auctions, however, achieved some measure of success. The
April auction resulted in the license of a bundle of two patents for
the minimum bid of $10,000.97 The December auction resulted in
licensing to two different companies, a single patent and a bundle
of two patents, for the respective minimum bids of $5,000 and
$10,000.98 Again, for rights that were likely to be abandoned, the
auction managed to generate some funding-likely significantly
more than needed to account for the cost of administration.
Fortuitously, the three successful licensees responded to our sur-
vey. All three produce yearly revenues between $1 and $10 million;
one licensee operates in the machinery industry, while another op-
erates in the electronic equipment industry. Two of the successful
licensees indicated that they submitted bids simply because they
found suitable issued patents at reasonable prices, but the third
stated that the licensee took part in the auction to protect a related
technology. All three respondents waited until the last minute to
bid in order to postpone revealing their interest in the technology
or to reduce the time others had to respond with a counter bid.
The strategic bidding behavior of these companies is probably not
a significant deterrent of other bidders, as these nascent auctions
are barely gaining recognition.99 Most survey respondents were
simply curious about Penn State's auction structure and chose to
observe either one or both auctions with no intention of placing a
bid. Many participants were familiarizing themselves with the sys-
tem Penn State used. One participant commented that he or she
subscribed to the auction to observe how the site worked and to
browse through the available issued patents. Another respondent
wanted to determine whether Penn State's auction structure would
be applicable to the technologies available at his or her university.
Nevertheless, future participation among the respondents seems
promising. Out of all the survey respondents, 74% said that they
are likely to participate in future licensing auctions. Of those who
were initially curious about the auction, but did not bid, 64% stated
96. Id.
97. Meeting with Dr. Ron Huss, supra note 4.
98. Id.
99. The majority of the survey respondents became aware of the auction though some
form of official marketing and distribution vehicle such as news articles, Internet posts, and




that they would likely participate again. Out of all those who par-
ticipated to see if there was something interesting worth buying,
83% said that they would participate again. When asked what
changes would motivate them more to participate in the future, of
the 20 who responded to this question, 11 stated that they were in-
terested in the availability of more promising, less senior patents;
5 wanted a lower minimum price; and 4 sought the ability to nego-
tiate/change other terms of the license contract.
There seems to be enthusiasm for the auction, as there are par-
ticipants who want to work with the university and see improve-
ments. One respondent, in particular, commented:
I am very interested in the patent auction, but the entry bid
should be low and the market will take it to the level it needs
to go. That said, there should be a path towards securing the
patent and making it work. That would entail establishing a
continuing relationship with Penn State to explore what fur-
ther can be done to make the patent viable.
A second respondent recommended creating access to the inven-
tor of the issued patent, as it may enhance the value of available
patents.
V. IMPROVING AUCTION STRUCTURE
In the end, what is the place for auctions in university intellec-
tual property transfers? Can auctions such as Penn State's serve
as a model for other universities? Even if auctions will not substi-
tute for all, or even most, licensing transactions, perhaps they will
provide an important supplement to one-on-one negotiations. Sig-
nificantly, even more could be achieved if patent auctions employ
the latest developments from research and practice in other do-
mains.
While fears associated with unsuccessful auction strategies can-
not be ignored, it is our view that further research and examination
of new and novel auction designs may actually serve to create suc-
cessful auction experiences for university IP.
A. Include Royalty Options in Addition to Lump Sums
A primary problem associated with the risky nature of university
IP is that bidding is generally concentrated on an upfront fee. More
bidders may be willing to participate if other dimensions can be con-
sidered and risk sharing allowed via a royalty contract. This is not
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an uncommon problem and has been addressed in other highly un-
certain auction contexts, such as those for gas and mineral rights.100
In fact, there is literature demonstrating that auctions that con-
sider these contingent payments may be preferred to those that do
not.101 This problem is not dissimilar to the initial complaint of
many in the procurement industry that variables other than price
matter substantially. Thus, many procurement contracts were not
amenable to auctioning. Chen-Ritzo and her co-authors show that
ascending auctions can be designed which allow the procurer to
simultaneously consider multiple, quantifiable dimensions, such as
quality and lead time, along with price.102
The inclusion of bidding in the royalty dimension requires the
university to decide the appropriate tradeoff between certain up-
front payments and highly uncertain royalty payments. However,
once this determination is made, the auction can proceed normally,
where bids are considered in both dimensions. This innovation
might induce participation by smaller, risk-averse bidders, thereby
increasing competition and limiting the opportunities for collusion,
which should result in increased revenue.
B. Avoidance of Patent Trolls: Pre-Qualification Versus Post-Auc-
tion Restriction
An obvious approach to the problem of patent trolls is to elimi-
nate them from the auction. While some might be easy to identify,
other undesirable bidders might be more difficult to identify and
come at the expense of limited competition in the auction. This is-
sue is not unlike the problem faced in many procurement set-
tings. 103 The risk of a non-performing contractor is so great that the
procurer needs to impose minimum guarantees to feel comfortable
with the selection of contractor.104 This process is known as pre-
100. Paul R. Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding,
50 ECONOMETRICA 1089, 1093-94 (1982).
101. Robert G. Hansen, Auctions with Contingent Payments, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 862, 864
(1985); Andrzej Skrzypacz, Auctions with Contingent Payments-an Overview, 31 INT'L J.
INDUS. ORG. 666, 666-67 (2013); Thomas Giebe & Elmar Wolfstetter, License Auctions with
Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers, 63 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 91, 105 (2008).
102. Ching-Hua Chen-Ritzo, et al., Better, Faster, Cheaper: An Experimental Analysis of a
Multiattribute Reverse Auction Mechanism with Restricted Information Feedback, 51 MGMT.
SC. 1753, 1760 (2005).
103. Tong Li & Xiaoyong Zheng, Entry and Competition Effects in First-Price Auctions:
Theory and Evidence from Procurement Auctions, 76 REV. ECON. STUD. 1397, 1400 (2009).
104. See Zhixi Wan & Damian R. Beil, RFQ Auctions with Supplier Qualification Screen-
ing, 57 OPERATIONS RES. 934, 948 (2009), for the analysis of such an auction.
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qualification and is utilized to ensure that only serious bidders are
allowed in the auction.105
It is entirely reasonable for universities to be concerned with the
employment of their property by licensees. Given the use of govern-
ment funding to create many patentable inventions, universities
are appropriately concerned about potential backlash if a patent is
used to limit the business activities of a sympathetic defendant. In
addition, universities may wish to promote socially beneficial uses
of their inventions without restriction. To the extent that a wide-
open, fast-paced auction structure permits a transfer that interferes
with these goals, a university may be reluctant to auction at all.
The traditional and simple solution is to pre-qualify participants
to ensure that only desirable licensees have access to the prop-
erty.106 Truly odious players can be cut out. But this process as-
sumes that universities can reasonably separate the wheat from the
chaff. Are all bad actors so clear that they can be identified with
pre-qualification criteria? To answer that question, one must define
the characteristics of a problematic licensee.
In a typical business licensing transaction, there are some con-
cerns about competitors. But because universities are generally not
market participants, competition is not an issue. This results in
social policy issues, the most problematic of which is currently the
patent troll issue. Unfortunately, it may not be so easy to identify
a patent troll ex ante. One might exclude a firm that has been listed
as a patent troll by existing researchers. However, other firms may
fall into the category of non-practicing entities and occasionally act
as trolls. On the other hand, even a notorious patent assertion en-
tity could theoretically engage in positive licensing that actually
disseminates technology. This is particularly true if the licensing
terms are appropriately restricted. In a given auction, an attempt
to pursue social policy by carving out bad actors seems likely to lead
to over and under inclusion that could still result in negative press
and money left on the table.
An alternate tack is to pursue Penn State's model of open partic-
ipation with a highly restrictive license.107 As Figure 3 summarizes,
Penn State requires licensees to abide by certain provisions. But
again, this is likely to cut out financially beneficial and legitimate
transactions. Some technologies are not as susceptible to trolling
105. Id.
106. Id. at 934.
107. Penn State Research Foundation, License Agreement, THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE
UNIVERSITY https://patents.psu.eduldata/radUploads/documents/License%/`20Agreement.pdf
(last visited June 4, 2015).
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as others,108 and applying the same terms across the board may be
excessive. In addition, light restrictions may be entirely appropri-
ate for some participants. Taking a belt and suspenders approach
to licensing restrictions is likely to make the entire transaction
overly unpalatable.











Licensee must bring licensed product
to market as soon as practical and
continue through licensing term.
Failure is material breach.
Penn State shall exclusive right to
prosecute any infringement or defend any
patent challenge for six months. Afterward,
licensee may bring action or defend. All
settlements approved by Penn State.
Licensee may not threaten
infringement action against
start-up company or end-user
unless direct competitor.
License products must be marked
with patent number.
The best process seems to be some combination of vetting and
restriction. In its simplest form, a university may have a highly
restrictive license for an open tier of participants. A less restrictive
instrument, however, may be available for vetted and approved par-
ticipants. For example, it makes sense for a strong anti-troll license
to have both production and litigation controls, as those are the de-
fining elements of the worst abusers of patent litigation. But what
if a patent aggregator such as Google wished to purchase a license
to ensure that the technology is available freely? The production
108. Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM.
L. REV. 2117, 2123 (2013) (stating that "Patent trolls are particularly common in the software
industry" and noting that software and Internet patents are ten times as likely to be as-
serted).








requirement would make such a transaction impossible. If this pro-
vision was excised, and the litigation restriction retained, an ac-
ceptable arrangement for both sides (as well as the public) could be
established. Conversely, a producing licensee may have a legiti-
mate interest in controlling litigation. It is unlikely that anyone
would conclude that a market participant was simply engaging in
trolling behavior, and the need for a fully restrictive license simply
does not exist.
Tiered participation will not necessarily interfere with an auc-
tion. In fact, different bidding rights and obligations are common-
place in government auctions. For example, small or rural busi-
nesses have received preferential bid credits in FCC license auc-
tions.1 10 Interested parties could seek the appropriate status from
the outset and reduce the likelihood of public backlash while pre-
serving revenue generation.
C. Incorporate Non-Exclusivity as a Possible Outcome
The procurement literature has identified the fact that auctions
that allow for multi-sourcing (i.e., more than one supplier is se-
lected to supply the same product) can be effective in lowering sup-
ply chain costs.' There are many reasons that multi-sourcing
makes sense in procurement. For example, it mitigates the risk of
a non-performing supplier and respects the long-term need to keep
multiple suppliers viable. Auctions may even be used to dynami-
cally determine whether it is profitable to multi-source. Interest-
ingly, the literature in the IP licensing domain suggests that multi-
licensing may be profitable for the IP holder because it fosters
greater downstream competition.112 While the motivations may be
different, it seems logical that auction designs might consider the
possibility that the IP license be assigned to multiple parties. Fur-
ther, this might help serve the motives of both the university (to
provide access to innovation) and the licensee, if exclusivity is not a
primary concern.
110. Thomas W. Hazlett et al., Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Ronald
Coase, 54 J. L. & ECON. 125, 141-42 (2011) (describing bidding preference for FCC auctions,
but noting that they are a poor choice); Jan Ayres & Peter Cramton, Deficit Reduction
Through Diversity: How Affirmative Action at the FCC Increased Auction Competition, 48
STAN. L. REV. 761, 771-74, 780-81 (1996) (arguing that bidding preferences are revenue en-
hancing).
111. Garud lyengar & Anuj Kumar, Optimal Procurement Mechanisms forDivisible Goods
with Capacitated Suppliers, 12 REV. ECON. DESIGN 129, 153 (2008).
112. See Morton I. Kamien, Patent Licensing, in HANDBOOK OF GAME THEORY WITH
ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS 331, 353 (1992).
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D. Other Design Changes to Consider
The previous points highlight some substantial changes that, alt-
hough not typically associated with auctions, may make auctions
more appropriate for university intellectual property assignment.
This section briefly details a few other changes that may also be
considered.
First, the auction reserve price is a critical variable in determin-
ing auction revenue. As some survey respondents uggested, Penn
State's choices may have been too high. That said, a word of caution
is necessary: If revenue maximization is the primary objective of
the university, then auction theory suggests that the reserve price
must be set fairly high to counteract the impact of monopsony on
the side of the bidder. Therefore, any changes to the reserve price
must address whether such a change is likely to increase revenue.
For example, if Penn State had lowered the reserve price to $1,000,
rather than $5,000 or $10,000, would it have sold sufficiently more
licenses at this lower price to increase revenue?
Second, Penn State chose to design an auction with a bidding
structure similar to the most well-known consumer auction site,
ebay.com, whereby all biding ended at fixed times.113 This bidding
structure is known as a hard close, and such a structure, while fa-
miliar and easy to implement, creates strong incentives for last mi-
nute bidding and may be revenue defeating.1 1 4 Notably, all bids
placed in Penn State's auction occurred very near the end of the
auction.115 Almost all large value auctions prefer a soft close, which
allows for the "going, going, gone" feature that is prevalent in live
auction events. This simple change might have an impact on auc-
tion revenue by encouraging more bidding.
Third, the nature of patents is that some can be viewed as com-
plements. For example, a single inventor or group of inventors may
file many related patents. When this occurs, the licensee might
seek to purchase the rights to all of these patents, and, if they fail,
they may find any fraction of the full complement of patents less
valuable. This is a well-known problem addressed in many domains
such as electromagnetic spectrum, airport landing rights, and ship-
ping.116 In order to maintain efficiency and revenue, an auction
113. Meeting with Dr. Ron Huss, supra note 4.
114. See Alvin E. Roth & Axel Ockenfels, Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending
Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet, 92 AM.
ECON. REV. 1093, 1093-94 (2002).
115. Meeting with Dr. Ron Huss, supra note 4.
116. Jarosz, supra note 38, at 13.
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known as a combinatorial auction may be necessary.1 17 Such auc-
tions allow for bidding on packages of licenses.118 Substantial re-
search has demonstrated the viability of such auctions.119 While
Penn State did allow bidding on some groups of patents, partici-
pants did not have the freedom to group their own.120 Given the
low-value nature of many of the patents auctioned, such a design
may have been unnecessarily complex. However, as universities
move to expand auctions to more attractive patents, combinatorial
auctions may be worth considering.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the previous discussion has been largely theoretically
based, it must be understood that, either due to the limitations of
economic theory or the peculiarities of human behavior, there is
much we cannot determine definitively about auctions and their
subsequent performance. In these cases, it is important to look to
experimental and empirical work to better understand how auc-
tions for university intellectual property might perform. In this pa-
per, for instance, we examined Penn State's 2014 auctions for con-
text. Further, since poorly performing auctions might result in sub-
stantial losses, bad publicity, and potential litigation, it is worth-
while to examine auction design issues before full implementa-
tion.121
In short, the problems faced by auctions for university intellec-
tual property are not substantially different than those dealt with
in other domains. While university IP might require unique re-




119. See, e.g., Peter Cramton et al., Introduction to Combinatorial Auctions, in
COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS 29, 30, 36 (Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham & Richard Steinberg
eds., 2006).
120. Meeting with Dr. Ron Huss, supra note 4.
121. To this end, the experimental economics laboratory is a useful bridge between ab-
stract theories of auction performance and practical implementation; it allows interested par-
ties to be more comfortable that the auction will perform as desired when actually put to the
test. This approach has been particularly profitable in complex domains such as the Federal
Communications Commission's well-known electromagnetic spectrum auctions. See gener-
ally Charles R. Plott, Laboratory Experimental Testbeds: Application to the PCS Auction, 6
J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 605 (1997). Kagel and Roth provide a thorough (but dated)
explanation of the many economics experiments related to auctions. Kagel, supra note 77, at
501-02.
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